This paper assesses aircraft susceptibility from the first principles, with respect to the threat posed by passively guided infrared homing missiles; with an objective of gaining insight into the comprehensiveness of the relationship between aircraft susceptibility and aircraft infrared signature level. The conventional criterion of aircraft susceptibility assessment based on its lock-on envelop is found to be inadequate, and a new criterion termed here as the Lethal Envelop is presented. The proposed susceptibility assessment criterion is more relevant for coming generation of infrared-guided missiles, because of advancements in the infrared detection technology. A threshold infrared signature level is also proposed as benchmark to be satisfied by all infrared signature suppression systems; if aircraft susceptibility to infrared guided missiles is to be reduced. This analysis is vital for gauging the effectiveness of infrared signature suppression systems. A typical air-to-air combat situation is simulated, and the results that lead to aircraft susceptibility assessment are obtained from this model, which illustrates the comprehensiveness of the redefined aircraft susceptibility assessment approach.
Introduction
As demonstrated in the Gulf war (1991) , and reiterated in the Kosovo Conflict (1999) and Afghanistan War (2001) (2002) , the key to success in Modern Warfare lies in establishing Air Superiority at an early stage of the war [3, 5, 9] . To achieve air superiority, an aircraft should exhibit a high degree of survivability in a human-made hostile environment, which is possible by incorporation of stealth features in the aircraft. Aircraft Stealth Technology primarily deals with reducing aircraft observables (both, active and passive), thus making it difficult for the enemy detectors to detect and track the aircraft [17] . The conjugate qualities of accuracy and survivability of stealth aircraft enables them to strike targets effectively that otherwise would require larger force packages of not only multiple strike aircraft, but also additional escorts, jammers, SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) aircraft and tankers [16] .
Control of air is achieved by air missions, including airto-air and air-to-ground operations by fighter aircraft. Air-toair conflicts in WW-I and WW-II were limited to close range encounters like the classical dogfight, in which 'gun' was the only weapon used. In Korean War (1950), Vietnam War (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) and Yom Kippur War (1973) , the majority of kill in air-to-air encounters were by guns [21] . Even though the development of guided AAMs dates back to late 50's and early 60's, it was only in the 80's that the technology matured enough to be used reliably in a tactical warfare.
Background
The IR-guided missiles have emerged as one of the most potent threats to aircraft, especially in recent years. They acquire and intercept aircraft by passively detecting IRradiation (heat signatures) from them. Thus, they do not require active impingement of radio signals on the target as in the case of Radar Homing or Semi Active Radar Homing (SARH) missiles, and therefore have truly fire and forget capability [22] . The IR-guided AAM can be launched from the parent aircraft, as soon as it locks-on to the target aircraft. The parent aircraft can then continue engaging other targets, unlike in the case of SARH missiles [11] . The IR-seekers passively detect the contrast generated between aircraft IR-emission and the background, as transmitted by the atmosphere. All IR-missiles have fire and forget capabilities and carry their own passive homing and guidance system onboard. This enhances their lethality because they do not inadvertently give prior information to the target aircraft like the radar homing missiles, which illuminate the target aircraft with radio waves. Thus, the target aircraft has less time to take countermeasures against IR-guided missiles, as compared to radar-guided counterparts. The restraint on aircraft flight envelop imposed by a ground based IR-guided Surface to Air Missile (SAM), based on the conventional aircraft susceptibility assessment criterion of lockon range, is provided by Mahulikar et al. [15] . The very first generation of IR-guided missiles used uncooled, low sensitivity IR-detectors; operating in the Short Wave IR (SWIR) band of 1.9-2.6 µm. However, they had a tendency to home on to the Sun, or the Sun's reflection in water; or any other intense source of IR-radiation. They were also erratic in their behaviour, and failed to achieve positive lock-on unless fired from close range in the rear aspect of the target aircraft [10] .
Motivation
The combat effectiveness of an aircraft in a hostile environment depends on many factors, like threat characteristics, aircraft capabilities and the operational environment. It has been observed that linear changes in aircraft survivability produce exponential changes in force effectiveness and aircraft attrition rates [25] . Thus, stealth technology helps aircraft to avoid high aircraft loss rates and complete the mission objectives effectively [12] . Modern air superiority fighters are designed for multi-role missions, with greater situational awareness and readiness.
The air-to-air battle scenario has changed in recent times with confrontation shifting from gun firing in the short range, to using missiles in both visual and beyond visual range. In order to reduce detection by enemy missiles, aircraft and helicopters use infrared signature suppression techniques. Some of the popular IRSS systems reported in literature for helicopters are: the Centre Body Tailpipe used on Bell 205-UH-1H [23, 24] , and the Black Hole Ocarina used on Apache AH-64 helicopter [2] . Though such systems are known to have reduced helicopter signature level, their effect in reducing the helicopter's susceptibility is uncertain, as there is no model reported in literature that provides a well-defined relationship between these two parameters. While designing IRSS systems/techniques for aircraft or helicopters, it is of paramount importance to evaluate the effectiveness of such systems on the survivability of the aircraft (which is the main objective of signature reduction), so that signature reduction options can be objectively compared and selected.
Aircraft lock-on
The infrared signature of aircraft as perceived by a missile's IR-detector, is the contrast in IR-emission between aircraft surface and the background radiance as transmitted by atmosphere, within the detector's wavelength band (in which detector has good responsivity). The maximum detection range of an IR-detector depends on its Noise Equivalent Irradiance (NEI: performance feature of the detector system) and the contrast generated by the target aircraft with respect to the background radiance. The total amount of radiation falling on IR-detector is the sum of target radiance and background radiance, as transmitted by intervening atmosphere [13] . Assuming that the detector's field of view is not filled by the target aircraft (the solid angle subtended by the aircraft at detector is less than the detector's field of view), irradiance on the detector (H ) is given as,
where, ω ac is the solid angle subtended by the target aircraft at the detector, given by A ac /R 2 , and ω d is the detector's field of view. All IR-detection systems produce inherent noise in addition to the external background noise. When aircraft irradiance on the detector is more than the net noise level of the detection system, the IR-detector is able to detect the target aircraft. If the irradiance exceeds a critical value (ξ min ) as compared to the noise level of the detection system, there is a high probability that the missile is able to track the target aircraft autonomously. This distance is the lock-on range, and the locus of all such points around the aircraft is the lock-on envelop for the aircraft.
The sources of IR-radiation vary with aircraft type. Also, the signature level varies with aircraft aspect, as the sources of IR-radiation in aircraft change with aspect. For a typical fighter aircraft, from the frontal aspect (head on), the airframe, especially the stagnation region of the aircraft nose and the leading edges of the wings are prime sources of IR signature. The fuselage, tailpipe and exhaust plume are not visible from the frontal aspect. From the side aspect, some parts of the airframe, the rear fuselage, and the exhaust plume are the main sources. From the rear aspect, the engine tailpipe, and the afterburner flame holders (if visible), emit IR-radiation like a blackbody. While a typical fighter aircraft will have tailpipe as the main source of IR-radiation, a hypersonic aircraft will have the aerodynamically heated airframe as the main source of IR signature. Therefore, for a fighter aircraft, the signature level is more in the rear aspect, whereas for a hypersonic aircraft, the signature level is more prominent in the frontal aspect. The IR signature level of an aircraft also varies with the operating conditions and its mission profile. Hence, the lock-on range, which is a function of the aircraft IR signature level, also varies with aircraft aspect, aircraft mission profile, operating conditions, atmospheric parameters, background radiation and missile detector performance.
A comprehensive methodology of evaluating IR signature due to rear fuselage and tailpipe is presented in references [13, 19] . The exhaust plume, which is an important source of IR signature from the aircraft side aspect, emits selectively in some narrow bands of the IR spectrum (4.15-4.20 µm). Modelling plume radiation of a typical fighter aircraft in the non-afterburning mode is described by Mahulikar et al. [14] . Computation of lock-on range from various sources of radiation in an aircraft from Eq. (1) is given as [18] ,
or
Eq. (2) succinctly brings out the role of atmosphere and background radiation in determining the aircraft IR signature, as perceived by the missile IR-detector. The background radiation can be due to the emission from sky (as considered here), ground, or sea, depending upon the relative position of the aircraft with respect to the IR-guided threat. While the aircraft radiation is seen in contrast to the background radiation, the atmospheric transmissivity dictates which part of the radiation will reach the missile IRdetector. The above equation is solved iteratively because R LO is dependent on atmospheric transmissivity (τ atm ), and τ atm is a function of R LO .
Aircraft susceptibility
Susceptibility is the probability that the aircraft will be detected, identified, and hit by the adversary in pursuit of its mission. Vulnerability is the probability that the aircraft will be killed after being hit by the adversary. Susceptibility is given as [1] ,
The probabilities on the right hand side of Eq. (3) can be determined by performing Essential Element Analysis (a technique in which an event is considered, and important preceding events that eventually lead to the final event are identified and represented in form of an event chain) over an eventuality when the aircraft is hit by a missile. Fig. 1 shows a block diagram, where the chain of various events leading to the final eventuality is represented by a bottom-to-top approach; the final event at the top is traced from below, to analyse the cause of the event. These elements are related to various aircraft and missile parameters. The probabilities in Eq. (3) associated with these elements are also shown in Fig. 1 . The locus of points around an aircraft where the missile seeker locks-on to the aircraft (missile is now able to track the target aircraft automatically), is the lock-on envelop. Conventionally, the lock-on envelop is considered as the scale to evaluate aircraft susceptibility. The various elements of Essential Element Analysis, along with the missile and aircraft parameters defining the lock-on envelop, are enclosed in the lower dashed box of Fig. 1 . Since lockon envelop affects only P DIT , Eq. (3) can be modified as, Fig. 1 that lock-on envelop fails to provide a complete picture of aircraft susceptibility, because it does not encompass other vital parameters. Even after a missile locks-on to the target aircraft, the probability of missile hitting the aircraft varies with other aircraft and missile parameters such as aircraft velocity, missile velocity, missile burnout range, missile guidance logic, etc. as shown in Fig. 1 .
The 'lethal envelop' is defined as the locus of points around the aircraft in which if the missile is launched, there is a high probability of missile hitting the target aircraft, or detonating sufficiently close to the aircraft to cause unserviceable damage. The lethal envelop is a function of aircraft lock-on envelop, aircraft velocity, missile velocity, missile burnout range, missile guidance logic and missile blast kill radius; shown by both the dashed boxes in Fig. 1 . Hence, the lethal range/envelop represents aircraft susceptibility in a better manner as compared to presently used lock-on range/envelop.
The primary focus of this investigation is correlating aircraft susceptibility with important aircraft parameters; and as clear from Fig. 1 , none of the aircraft parameters affect P L and P A . Hence, Eq. (3) is regrouped as, P H = Kf (A lethal )P Dt ; where, f (A lethal ) = P DITG , and K = P L P A . For focussing on the evaluation of aircraft susceptibility from additional parameters, K is assumed unity (the missile is assumed to be ideal with no snags during launch). Thus, lock-on envelope is not adequate for defining aircraft susceptibility, and lethal envelop is a better criterion of judging aircraft susceptibility, as illustrated later by the results.
Lethal envelop prediction model
The lethal envelop depends on several aircraft and missile parameters (ref. Fig. 1 ). A basic model to evaluate the lethal envelop for a simplistic case is presented here. Fig. 2 depicts a representative air-to-air battle scenario between two aircraft. The attacking aircraft launches an IR-guided AAM at the target aircraft, which is moving in a straight flight path (shown by dashed line at the origin in Fig. 2) . Generally, the difference between the altitudes of these two aircraft is less as compared to the distance separating them; hence, the two Fig. 2 . Typical air-to-air battle scenario.
aircraft can be considered to be flying in the same horizontal plane. Burnout range of an AAM is the maximum range that the missile can traverse after being launched from the parent aircraft, without loosing its altitude or manoeuvrability. The burnout range primarily depends on the missile propulsion system (mass and type of propellant). The AAM is fired by the attacking aircraft as soon as AAM locks-on to the target aircraft. As shown in Fig. 1 , the lethal envelop depends on the lock-on envelop, which is a function of the aircraft signature level, hence the lethal envelop will change with aircraft aspect. To prove that the lethal envelop also takes into account other important aircraft and missile parameters, and to keep the analysis generic, the aircraft here is considered as an isotropic source of IR signature. Also, by adopting this approach, the variation in background radiation, atmospheric transmissivity, background clutter, etc. with aircraft aspect, which are not of fundamental interest, are suppressed. It will be shown later that the outcome of the present analysis, the threshold IR signature level (IRSL th ), is independent of the aircraft signature level.
Because the prime focus of this paper is to establish a relation between aircraft IR signature level and aircraft susceptibility, following assumptions are made to eliminate considerations that are not of basic importance and interest:
(i) The confrontation of the target aircraft and AAM carrying attacking aircraft is in the same horizontal plane. (ii) The aircraft is assumed to be a point source of IRradiation, with IR signature level and consequently, the lock-on range being constant in all aspects; as shown in Fig. 2 . (iii) Since acceleration limits for missiles are much greater than that for aircraft, manoeuvring the aircraft for evading a locked-on missile is generally not effective. It is assumed here that aircraft is not manoeuvring nor using any countermeasures against the approaching AAM. (iv) The AAM is launched by the attacking aircraft as soon as AAM locks-on to the target aircraft.
This is a conservative approach from aircraft susceptibility point of view. Based on the above assumptions, a model is developed to calculate the lethal envelop around an aircraft, against a self-guided IR homing AAM. The model simulates an air-to-air battle, wherein an AAM locks-on to the target aircraft and chases the target continuously and automatically, after being launched from the attacking aircraft. If the target aircraft is within the burnout range of the missile, so that there is adequate propellant and consequently time available for the missile to intercept the aircraft, then there is a high probability (idealised as one in this investigation) of AAM hitting its target. The flow chart of this model is shown in Fig. 3 . The path traced by an AAM launched at an angle of 150 • with respect to the target aircraft axis, is shown in Fig. 4 . The missile continuously chases the target aircraft up to its burnout range, and detonates when sufficiently close to the aircraft. For a given aspect, the maximum range inside the lock-on envelop in which the AAM can be launched at the target aircraft, so that the missile can make a successful hit, is the 'lethal range'. The locus of all such points, for all aspects around the target aircraft, is the 'lethal envelop'.
Most modern generation anti-aircraft missiles use sophisticated guidance logic, to chase the target aircraft. Acceleration of the missile in the final phase of its pursuit is less than that encountered in the conventional guidance logic, such as "Dog Pursuit". However, since the target aircraft is not undertaking any evasive manoeuvring, and to keep the analysis simple, the "Dog Pursuit" guidance logic for missiles is used here.
Lethal envelop plots
Over the years, development in missile technology has been primarily highlighted by advancements in IR-detector technology. Early generation IR-guided missiles were characterised by low lock-on range as compared to their burnout range, but modern generation state of the art IR-guided missiles are characterised by high lock-on range as compared to their burnout range (restricted by propellant weight and volume), leading to a paradigm shift in aircraft susceptibility against IR-guided threat.
There have been significant developments in IR-detector technology over the years [20] . Latest generation missiles use cooled GaAs/AlGaAs (Aluminium Gallium Arsenide) and HgCdTe (Mercury Cadmium Telluride) detectors operating in mid-wave IR band (3-5 µm) band and long wave IR band (8-12 µm) band; that are more sensitive and discriminatory than the early detectors. They detect radiation in a wider spectrum, and are capable of locking-on to the aircraft from all aspects. Such systems are immune to some IR countermeasures, like the IR flares, which appear as a point source, and are ignored by the detector [22] . New generation IR-detectors based on QWIP (Quantum Well Infrared Photodetectors) technology use multi-colour thermal-imaging systems that employ an array of detectors to build a spectral map of the scene [4, 6, 8] . Such detectors will eventually find their way in IR-guided missiles, making IR signature level management even more stringent. Fig. 5 shows lethal envelop plots around the target aircraft, obtained from the model described in the previous sub-section, for four cases. They are representative of the advancement in IR-guided missile technology that has been primarily highlighted by advancements in IR-detector technology. A typical IR-guided AAM with a burnout range of 10 km and an average velocity of 600 m/s against a target aircraft moving with a constant velocity of 200 m/s, is used to study the variation in aircraft susceptibility. In the first case in Fig. 5 (a) (R LO < R bo ): for a lock-on range of 8 km (lock-on envelop is 201 km 2 ), the lethal envelop obtained is 186 km 2 . The difference between lock-on and lethal envelop is around 7% of lock-on envelop. Thus, lock-on envelop gives a fair assessment of aircraft susceptibility for cases when lock-on range is less than missile burnout range. In the second case (Fig. 5(b) ), for a lock-on range of 10 km (R LO = R bo ) and lock-on envelop of 314 km 2 , the computed lethal envelop is 243 km 2 (difference being more than 20% of lock-on envelop). If lock-on range is increased to 12 km with a lock-on envelop of 452 km 2 (R LO > R bo ), the lethal envelop also increases to 287 km 2 (shown in Fig. 5(c) ). In the fourth case, when lock-on range is further increased to 15 km (R LO = 1.5R bo ) with lock-on envelop of 706 km 2 ( Fig. 5(d) ), the lethal envelop is obtained as 304 km 2 , difference being 57% of the lock-on envelop. Even with the conservative assumptions mentioned earlier, it is evident from these plots that as the lock-on range of IR-guided missile has increased over the years, the discrepancy between lethal and lock-on envelope has also increased. Thus, lock-on envelop is not comprehensive enough for correlating aircraft susceptibility, and does not provide a proper assessment of aircraft susceptibility (especially for modern generation IR-guided missiles). Hence, re-definition of aircraft susceptibility in terms of lethal envelop is mandatory.
The lock-on envelop encloses the lethal envelop (A LO A lethal ) because an IR-guided missile is lethal only after it locks-on to the target aircraft. Even when the lock-on envelop is considered to be constant in all direction, the lethal envelop is found to be direction dependent. This proves that the lethal envelop is a function of other aircraft and missile parameters, as mentioned earlier. The lethal range is more in the frontal aspect of the aircraft (θ = 0 • ) as compared to the rearward aspect (θ = 180 • ), because of increase in tracking rate between missile and target aircraft in the frontal aspect. As the ratio of missile lock-on range to burnout range (R LO /R bo ) reduces, lethal envelop approaches the lock-on envelop. The variation of lethal envelop with lock-on range for the above cases is in Fig. 6 . Depending on the slope, the plot can be divided in to three regions. In the first region, the slope is monotonically increasing and is characterised by a low value of lock-on range to missile burnout range ratio. In this region, the missile burnout range is greater than lockon range; hence, the lethal envelop is determined mainly by lock-on range. The difference between lock-on envelop and lethal envelop is insignificant (early generation IR-missiles belong to this region). The second region is characterised by lethal envelop being constrained by missile burnout range, and thus the slope gradually decreases in this region. The third region is characterised by zero slope or constant value of lethal envelop. In this region, lethal envelop attains the maximum possible value (A lethal,max ) for a given burnout range, and becomes independent of the lock-on range, and consequently aircraft IRSL.
Aircraft threshold infrared signature level
The minimum threshold value of lock-on range at which the lethal envelop becomes independent of lock-on range, and A lethal,max is achieved, is denoted as R LO,th ; the corresponding threshold value of IRSL is denoted as IRSL th . Thus, any further increase in lock-on range (due to increase in missile detection capabilities or increase in aircraft IRSL), does not reflect in lethal envelop. From aircraft point of view, this implies that if lock-on range is not reduced below R LO,th by reducing aircraft IRSL to a value lower than IRSL th , it has no effect on aircraft susceptibility. Hence, for any IRSS system/technique to be effective, it must decrease aircraft IRSL below IRSL th , else reduction in signature level is futile, only leading to penalties like additional weight, drag, radar cross section (RCS), and back-pressure on the engine. Thus, estimation of IRSL th is of paramount importance. Fig. 7 shows the polar plot for the case, R LO > R LO,th ; hence, A lethal,max is achieved. The lethal range (independent of the lock-on range) in a given aspect, as a function of missile burnout range, missile velocity, and aircraft velocity can be given as,
where, m = V ac /V m . Thus, As illustrated in Fig. 7 and by definition, R lethal,max is the maximum lethal range in any aspect (frontal aspect of aircraft in the present analysis; since, maximum lethal range is obtained in the frontal aspect due to highest relative velocity). Hence, R lethal,max = (1 + m)R bo . The lock-on range for an IR-seeker is given by Eq. (2.1). Thus, the threshold IR signature level (IRSL th ) in a given aspect can be calculated by substituting above R lethal in Eq. (2.1) as, IRSL th = (R 2 lethal NEI ξ min )/τ atm , i.e.
It can be seen from Eqs. (4)- (6), that the various quantities derived from the analysis like A lethal,max , IRSL th , etc. are not a function of aircraft IRSL. These quantities are dictated by other aircraft and missile parameters shown in Fig. 1 . Hence, the assumption of aircraft being treated as an isotropic source of IR signature is justified. Fig. 8 shows a plot of lethal envelop versus lock-on range for various velocity ratios, m. The curves with higher V ac /V m ratio (higher m) have smaller lethal envelopes, because of decrease in tracking rate by the missile. Thus, increase in aircraft velocity diminishes the lethal envelop, making the aircraft less susceptible. On the contrary, reducing m by increasing missile velocity would lead to an increase in the lethal envelope, thereby increasing aircraft susceptibility (reducing aircraft survivability). As an illustration, according to the conventional susceptibility assessment criterion of lock-on envelop, a high-supersonic/hypersonic aircraft (having high IR signature levels because of aerodynamic heating and high engine power) would be more susceptible than a conventional aircraft. According to the redefined susceptibility criterion of lethal envelop, the highsupersonic/hypersonic aircraft in spite of having larger lockon envelop, would have a relatively diminished lethal en-velop (because of larger m). Consequently, the susceptibility of high supersonic aircraft is comparable to that of the conventional aircraft. Thus, the new criterion portrays a comprehensive picture of aircraft susceptibility assessment.
Dimensional analysis for lethal envelop characterisation
Since the lethal envelop is a function of several aircraft and missile parameters (as shown in Fig. 1) , it is necessary to appropriately group these parameters to characterise the variation of lethal envelop. The functional dependence of lethal envelop can be written as,
The dimension/s of these quantities are (where
where,L and T are the basic dimensions of length and time, respectively. As there are five quantities and two fundamental dimensions, the Buckingham-Π theorem [7] indicates three dimensionless groups. Hence, Eq. (7) 3 ). Using these three dimensionless groups, the variation of lethal envelop with aircraft and missile parameters, is plotted in Fig. 9 . When the ratio, R LO /R bo is less, the lethal envelop is equal to lock-on envelop; and the discrepancy between lock-on and lethal envelop increases with increase in, R LO /R bo . It is discussed later that the ratio, A lethal /A LO , is conditional aircraft susceptibility.
Susceptibility analysis
Aircraft susceptibility can be defined as the ratio of number of missile/threat propagators that hit the aircraft to the number of threat propagators fired at the aircraft. The AAM can be fired from anywhere in the lock-on envelop, and AAM will hit the target aircraft if fired within the lethal envelop. Hence, susceptibility can now be defined as, P H = P H/LO P LO ; where, P H/LO is the conditional probability (conditional to lock-on occurring) that the missile fired upon lock-on hits the aircraft. Thus, P H/LO reduces to the area ratio, P H/LO = A lethal /A LO , and P LO is the probability of lock-on, again defined as an area ratio, P LO = A LO /A eng . The engagement envelop (A eng ) is independent of target aircraft IRSL, and may be dictated by other parameters such as detection and tracking of target aircraft by enemy's early warning net, AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System) or GCI (Ground Control Intercept), etc. Thus, aircraft susceptibility can now be obtained as, P H = A lethal /A eng ; and the percentage change in aircraft susceptibility due to change in the aircraft IRSL can be evaluated as,
While designing an IRSS system, it is of utmost importance to estimate the amount by which the aircraft IR signature level should be reduced, in order to achieve the desired reduction in aircraft susceptibility; so that an effective IRSS technique can be selected or designed. Fig. 10 shows variation of lock-on range and lethal envelop with aircraft IRSL, for a typical military aircraft against a typical IR-guided AAM having a burnout range of 10 km. The lock-on range increases monotonically with aircraft IRSL, whereas the lethal envelop increases with aircraft IRSL initially, and then attains a constant value at threshold signature level, IRSL th . The percentage change in aircraft susceptibility with aircraft IRSL for the same case using Eq. (8) is in Fig. 11 . Here, percentage change in aircraft susceptibility is obtained by taking aircraft IRSL of 290 W/Sr as the reference, which is the typical aircraft IRSL value (3-5 µm) from the rear aspect of a typical twin engine fighter aircraft in the nonafterburning mode. Aircraft susceptibility is affected only when the aircraft IRSL is reduced to a level below the threshold value, IRSL th . The results from the present analysis are applicable for cases where aircraft lock-on range varies with aircraft aspect, because the lock-on range can be assumed to be constant in the small aspect. From practical implementation view-point, unless the IRSS (designed for an aircraft or helicopter to shield the tailpipe and/or to cool the plume) reduces the aircraft IRSL below IRSL th , incorporation of IRSS is futile. The variation of aircraft threshold IR signature level (IRSL th ) against a medium range IR threat, with aspect angle, for various velocity ratios, is shown in Fig. 12 . It can be seen that the value of IRSL th is more in the frontal aspect as compared to the rear aspect. Also, as the velocity ratio increases, the IRSL th envelop shifts towards the front. From a realistic view point, it can be seen from Fig. 12 that for a conventional fighter aircraft (without any IRSS), the aircraft IRSL is more than IRSL th in the rear aspect and vice versa in the frontal aspect and side aspect. This implies that even a moderate reduction of aircraft IRSL in the frontal and side aspect can reduce aircraft susceptibility, but a huge reduction in aircraft IRSL in the rear aspect (from tailpipe and plume) will be required to reduce aircraft IRSL below IRSL th . This also implies that for a typical fighter, in which aircraft IRSL is more than the IRSL th in the rear aspect, any increase in aircraft IRSL (e.g. switching on afterburner) will not affect aircraft susceptibility to medium range IR-guided threats. For a hypersonic aircraft, Fig. 12 implies that the best way to reduce susceptibility is to reduce aircraft IRSL in the frontal aspect, because IRSL th is more in the frontal aspect.
Summary and conclusions
1. Various aircraft and missile parameters affecting aircraft susceptibility and the probabilities associated with these parameters are illustrated using Essential Element Analysis. These probabilities are regrouped using additional important aircraft and missile parameters, for assessing aircraft susceptibility. 2. Due to significant advancements in performance of infrared detectors, modern missiles are generally constrained by their burnout range rather than their lock-on range; which has led to a paradigm shift. Lock-on envelop, which depends only on aircraft infrared signature level and missile seeker performance, is now inadequate in providing a comprehensive assessment of aircraft susceptibility. 3. Aircraft susceptibility is redefined in terms of lethal envelop, which is a function of infrared signature level of aircraft, aircraft velocity, infrared detector's performance, missile velocity, missile burnout range, and missile blast kill radius. 4. As the ratio of aircraft lock-on range to missile burnout range decreases, lethal envelop tends to lock-on envelop. Thus, lock-on envelop gives a fair assessment of aircraft susceptibility for older generation infrared guided missiles, which were mainly constrained by lock-on range and not by their burnout range.
5. For modern missiles, the discrepancy between lock-on and lethal envelop is significant enough to necessitate a redefinition of aircraft susceptibility based on lethal envelop, in lieu of the earlier criterion of lock-on envelop. 6. The lethal envelop first increases monotonically with lock-on range, and then attains a constant maximum value, A lethal,max . Thus, any further increase in lock-on range/envelop does not reflect in lethal envelop around the aircraft. 7. An infrared signature suppression system/technique is effective only if it can reduce aircraft infrared signature level, to a value below the threshold infrared signature level. 8. Change in aircraft susceptibility is same as change in lethal envelop for an aircraft. 9. For a hypersonic aircraft, its IR signature should be reduced only in the frontal aspect. 10. For a typical fighter aircraft, in which aircraft IRSL is more that the IRSL th in the rear aspect, any increase in aircraft IRSL (e.g. switching on afterburner), will not affect aircraft bottom line susceptibility against medium range IR-guided missiles.
